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A commentary on
The body social: an enactive approach to the self
by Kyselo, M. (2014). Front. Psychol. 5:986. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986
The article byMiriamKyselo titled “The body social: an enactive approach to the self ” (Kyselo, 2014)
raises a crucial issue and discusses how bodily and social aspects may merge together in a unique
account of the human self. The author rightly suggests that we do not have to choose between the
bodily and social dimensions of self.
The integration process between bodily and social self may fail in patients with a number of
neurological and psychiatric diseases, as well as during certain experimental conditions (Lucci and
Pazzaglia, 2015). Various neurological conditions produce disturbed self perceptions, for example
disownership of one’s hand in somatoparaphrenia (Vallar and Ronchi, 2009; Romano et al., 2014),
desire for amputation in body integrity identity disorder (Sedda, 2011), unintended movements
in alien hand syndrome (Della Sala et al., 1991), ownership for supernumerary limbs (Guterstam
et al., 2011) or seeing own body from a third person perspective in out of body experiences (Blanke
and Arzy, 2005). The illusory alterations of awareness of the bodily self can be also induced experi-
mentally during the so-called “rubber hand illusion”—RHI (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), where the
subjective perceptual experience interfere with bodily self and the external bodily-shaped object is
treated as part of the body. These clinical populations and experimental condition may challenge
Kyselo’s view, as bodily self could be disrupted despite a normal social self.
However, an example of the complementarity of bodily and social self are patients with spinal
cord injury (SCI). “The loss of self is inherent in the social isolation of paralytics, who have further-
more become separated from their bodies by neural damage, and from their former identities by
society” (Murphy, 2001; p. 227). SCI can leave a part of the body insensible and immobile, leading
to specific disorders in the mental representation of one’s own body and the sense of bodily self
(Lenggenhager et al., 2012, 2013). After SCI, patients see their former life slip away and become
restricted, and the social implications can be considerable. They must adapt to their new body and
make significant changes in the way they function in the world. Here we propose that a medium
that accepts self-multiplicity while also offering an integrative perspective on the self is possible. We
consider how an assistive tool can change the manner in which people with massive disconnection
between body and brain access to social world.
For people who chose to integrate their disability into their full sense of self, the wheelchair
represents a changing paradigm, as highlighted by significant theoretical models (Papadimitriou,
2008; Standal, 2011) and experimental studies (Arnhoff andMehl, 1963;Winance, 2006a,b; Higuchi
et al., 2009; Olsson, 2012; Fuentes et al., 2013; Pazzaglia et al., 2013). When patients do not
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perceive the loss or limitation and instead focus on the power
and joy of seeing the world, “I could whiz around and feel the
wind inmy face again. Just being out on the street was exhilarating”
(Austin, 2014), the wheelchair becomes a symbol of both physi-
cal and social independence for the body injured. Even for people
with life-threatening illnesses, this tool provides a way to be out in
the world, continuing their lives and accessing the many realms
of human experience (Karp, 2008).
The plastic shaping of the bodily self has already been demon-
strated bymultiple neuropsychological studies showing that tools
can be integrated into the representation of one’s own body (Mar-
avita and Iriki, 2004; Cardinali et al., 2009; Tsakiris, 2010; Longo
and Serino, 2012). In the process, known as embodiment, the
tool is processed in the same way as a part of one’s body (De
Vignemont, 2011), allowing a new connection between the sense
of having a modified functional body and the sense of self. In
the case of SCI, the wheelchair, which contributes to the indi-
vidual’s conscious movement, can be added to the dynamic rep-
resentation of patients’ bodily self. From a physical perspective,
the corporeal awareness of a tool emerges as the functional self
with its new rules and novel ways of interacting with the world
(Pazzaglia et al., 2013). Through the use of the wheelchair, the
perceived bodily self is that of being functionally whole, enabling
the immobile user to act in the world again.
The wheelchair becomes a vehicle of freedom of mobility and
independence for newly abled adults, reconstructing their sense
of self (Papadimitriou, 2008). A deep embodiment process of the
en-wheeled body can occur, enhanced for both the loss of senso-
rimotor function (Pazzaglia et al., 2013) and the critical sense of
protection and monitoring (Rossetti et al., 2015).
From a social perspective, the injury affects consciousness as
it introduces a novel pervasive identity. The tool incorporation
process described above involves new ways of being in the world,
i.e., the relations between self and others and the world (Winance,
2006a,b; Papadimitriou, 2008). The wheelchair increases per-
meability of the boundary between disabled and non-disabled
individuals, directly mitigating the impairment and thereby help-
ing the user escaping disability (Nario-Redmond et al., 2013).
Functional and smooth wheelchair use significantly contributes
to the production of a new identity and allows the individual to
cope with his disability by emphasizing one’s strengths, interests,
and efficacy. It has the liberating aspect of providing opportu-
nities to participate in social activities, through the new form
of the body. In this case, disablement is not simply a physical
affair; rather, it is a lifelong process of adjusting to changed cir-
cumstances (Pentland et al., 2002) that ultimately results in a
transformation from disabled to newly abled. Being active and
engaged constitutes a starting point for restructuring the social
self. Emerging empirical data support the importance of the
social context in shaping self-perceptions after a SCI (Fuhrer,
1996). Several surveys of patients with SCI revealed that their
self-reported quality of life was only slightly different from that
of control subjects without SCI (Stensman, 1994). Moreover, the
quality of life for this population, regardless of severity of impair-
ment, consisted of various themes (Manns and Chad, 2001) such
as accessibility, emotional well-being, stigma, spontaneity, rela-
tionships and social function, occupation, finances and inde-
pendence, additionally to the expected physical variables such
as functionality and physical well-being. Similarly, patients with
locked-in syndrome can adjust very well to the objective physical
change and actually feel the same as before (Nizzi et al., 2012),
although changes in their self-awareness and quality of life are
not mediated by any functional prosthetic tool, which in this
case would not have the meaning of unifying bodily and activity
extremely restricted of social self.
The effort to understand how people maintain psychological
well-being despite physical and social challenges is a core topic of
many human sciences. The field has shifted from amedical model
of disability as a functional limitation of living without move-
ment and sensation, to a social model that includes consequent
relational problems (Altman, 2001; Williams, 2001; Cole, 2004;
Darling and Heckert, 2010). Both physical and emotional adjust-
ments that follow wheelchair use could result in a new bodily and
social-self representation, in which the person may incorporate
the wheelchair (Fuentes et al., 2013; Pazzaglia et al., 2013). Bodily
changes can affect and be integrated into our self as a disordered
organism regains a state of order (Goldstein, 1939). The fact that
quality of life often equates with social rather than physical sta-
tus (Gosseries et al., 2009) makes sense when the boundaries of
self are not determined by bodily processes alone, but are instead
plastic in terms of relational and social interactions. Although the
relationship between actual bodily states and embodied cogni-
tion has been widely explored, little is known about how changes
in the connection between brain and body periphery, occur-
ring after a traumatic SCI, influence higher-level embodied self
such as perspective-taking, inter-subjectivity and group member-
ship, which makes these topics extremely challenging for future
investigations.
As an individual has to change adaptively (Thompson, 2007)
by flexibly regulating his own identity (Di Paolo, 2005), it is likely
that when discussing individuality, SCI patients do not view their
self as primarily physical or social, but rather including both
aspects of self-definition and the embodiment of the functional
tool that permits them to re-negotiate their self as a whole.
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